Guided by Basic Psychological Need Theory, we investigated the combined associations between need satisfaction and need frustration and their relations with theoretically relevant correlates including mindfulness, physical literacy, physical activity enjoyment, and physical activity. The participants were Singapore-based school students who completed a cross-sectional survey. The results of the latent profile analysis identified four distinct need profiles: profile 1–average satisfaction and frustration ; profile 2–low satisfaction, above average frustration; profile 3–very high satisfaction, very low frustration ; and profile 4–high satisfaction, (...) very high frustration. Among these, profile 3 was the most adaptive one; it had the highest levels of mindfulness, physical literacy, physical activity enjoyment, and moderate-to-vigorous physical activity. Experiences of need satisfaction countered the negative effects of need frustration on these correlates. These findings enhance our understanding of students’ psychological need experiences and highlight the need for investigating the combined associations between need satisfaction and need frustration. (shrink)

This is a reply to a paper by Graham Oppy in the July, 1999 issue of this journal, “Koons’ Cosmological Argument.” Recent work in defeasible or nonmonotonic logic means that the cosmological argument can be cast in such a way that it does not presuppose that every contingent situation, without exception, has a cause. Instead, the burden of proof is shifted to the skeptic, who must produce positive reasons for thinking that the cosmos is an exception to the defeasible law (...) of causality. I show how Oppy’s critique can be turned into a plausible rebuttal of my argument. However, this rebuttal can be set aside when the original argument is supplemented by a plausible account of the nature of causal priority. Several independent lines of argument in support of this account are outlined. (shrink)

In this wide-ranging philosophical work, Koons takes on two powerful dogmas--anti-realism and materialism.

Rho, a member of the Ras superfamily of small GTPases, has multiple biological roles: it regulates signal trasduction pathways linking extracellular growth factors to the assembly of actin stress fibres and focal adhesion complexes; it is required for G1 progression and activates the SRF transcription factor when quiescent fibroblasts are stimulated to grow; and it plays a role later in the cell cycle during cytokinesis. Two groups have recently succeeded in identifying downstream effectors of Rho that may mediate some of (...) these biological effects. One protein identified by both groups is protein kinase N (PKN), a serine/threonine kinase whose catalytic domain is closely related to that of protein kinase C(1,2). (shrink)

Many response-dependence theorists equate moral truth with the generation of some affective psychological response: what makes this action wrong, as opposed to right, is that it would cause (or merit) affective response of type R (perhaps under ideal conditions). Since our affective nature is purely contingent, and not necessarily shared by all rational creatures (or even by all humans), response-dependence threatens to lead to relativism. In this paper, I will argue that emotional responses and moral features do not align in (...) the way predicted by the response-dependence theorist who wishes to tie morality to emotional affect. I further argue that since response-dependence accounts that tie morality to any sort of affect (be it an emotion, a desire, a desire to desire, or so on) cannot explain the objectivity and universality of morality; and since we do not need a psychological response to play a truth-constituting role in morality in order to explain the normativity or content of morality, we should reject such response-dependence accounts. (shrink)

The last two decades have seen two significant trends emerging within the philosophy of science: the rapid development and focus on the philosophy of the specialised sciences, and a resurgence of Aristotelian metaphysics, much of which is concerned with the possibility of emergence, as well as the ontological status and indispensability of dispositions and powers in science. Despite these recent trends, few Aristotelian metaphysicians have engaged directly with the philosophy of the specialised sciences. Additionally, the relationship between fundamental Aristotelian concepts—such (...) as "hylomorphism", "substance", and "faculties"—and contemporary science has yet to receive a critical and systematic treatment. _Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science _aims to fill this gap in the literature by bringing together essays on the relationship between Aristotelianism and science that cut across interdisciplinary boundaries. The chapters in this volume are divided into two main sections covering the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of the life sciences. Featuring original contributions from distinguished and early-career scholars, this book will be of interest to specialists in analytical metaphysics and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Many naturalistically-minded philosophers want to accomplish a naturalistic reduction of normative (e.g. moral and epistemic) claims. Mindful of avoiding the naturalistic fallacy, such philosophers claim that they are not reducing moral and epistemic concepts or definitions. Rather, they are only reducing the extension of these normative terms, while admitting that the concepts possess a normative content that cannot be naturalistically reduced. But these philosophers run into a serious problem. I will argue that normative claims possess two dimensions of normativity. I (...) will further argue that certain of the reductionist’s commitments require that these two dimensions of normativity be given a naturalistic reduction, while the other of the reductionist’s commitments make such a reduction impossible. Thus, the reductionist’s commitments both require and forbid a reductionist account of morality and epistemology. Thus, as we will see, reductionism is torn between two incompatible requirements, and must fail. (shrink)

Since the introduction of Ethereum in 2015, blockchain technology (BT) has been evolving, and BT has been associated with the concept of the sharing economy by business academics. Despite the marketing research on the sharing economy that has been extensively conducted in the last decade, the linkage between BT and ethical marketing in the sharing economy remains unclear. Through a systematic literature review of 163 articles and a co-citation analysis, this study identifies the key elements of blockchain capabilities, blockchain attributes, (...) and the underlying economic theories of blockchain. It also synthesizes and proposes a shift of ethical marketing logic in the blockchain-based sharing economy that delineates the principles of stakeholder capitalism. The article concludes with a list of future research directions that underline three approaches of stakeholder theory (i.e., the descriptive, instrument, and normative approaches). These directions aim to guide marketing scholars concerning how BT enables an institutionally embedded view of ethical marketing activities and practices that enhance collaborative marketing and subsequently innovate value chains and create sustainable business models in the sharing economy, as well as to the metaverse. (shrink)

A staunch hylomorphism involves a commitment to a sparse theory of universals and a sparse theory of composite material objects, as well as to an ontology of fundamental causal powers. Faint-hearted hylomorphism, in contrast, lacks one or more of these elements. On the staunch version of HM, a substantial form is not merely some structural property of a set of elements—it is rather a power conferred on those elements by that structure, a power that is the cause of the generation (...) (by fusion) and persistence of a composite whole through time. Bernard Williams discussed (and rejected) a faint-hearted version of HM in 1986, and faint-hearted HM has been defended more recently by Mark Johnston (2006) and Kathrin Koslicki (2008). I defend the superiority of the staunch version, in spite of its heavier ontological commitments, as a way of accounting for a real distinction between living organisms and heaps of matter, without recourse to dualism or vitalism, and as a way of combining a powers ontology with the possibility of gunk. (shrink)

The Principle of Sufficient Reason must be justified dialectically: by showing the disastrous consequences of denying it. We formulate a version of the Principle that is restricted to basic natural facts, which entails the obtaining of at least one supernatural fact. Denying this principle results in extreme empirical skepticism. We consider six current theories of empirical knowledge, showing that on each account we cannot know that we have empirical knowledge unless we all have a priori knowledge of the PSR. We (...) consider objections based on Neo-Humeanism and the essentiality of origins, and we consider the possibility that we have empirical knowledge without knowing it. (shrink)

The paper addresses a problem for the unification of quantum physics with the new Aristotelianism: the identification of the members of the category of substance. I outline briefly the role that substance plays in Aristotelian metaphysics, leading to the postulating of the Tiling Constraint. I then turn to the question of which entities in quantum physics can qualify as Aristotelian substances. I offer an answer: the theory of thermal substances, and I construct a fivefold case for thermal substances, based on (...) the irreversibility of time, the definition of thermodynamic concepts, spontaneous symmetry breaking, phase transitions, and chemical form. (shrink)

It has been argued that organs should be treated as individual tradable property like other material possessions and assets, on the basis that this would promote individual freedom and increase efficiency in addressing the shortage of organs for transplantation. If organs are to be treated as property, should they be inheritable? This paper seeks to contribute to the idea of organs as inheritable property by providing a defence of a default of the family of a dead person as inheritors of (...) transplantable organs. In the course of discussion, various succession rules for organs and their justifications will be suggested. We then consider two objections to organs as inheritable property. Our intention here is to provoke further thought on whether ownership of one's body parts should be assimilated to property ownership. (shrink)

During an outbreak or pandemic involving a novel disease such as COVID-19, infected persons may need to undergo strict medical isolation and be separated from their families for public health reasons. Such a practice raises various ethical questions, the characteristics of which are heightened by uncertainties such as mode of transmission and increasingly scarce healthcare resources. For example, under what circumstances should non-infected parents be allowed to stay with their infected children in an isolation facility? This paper will examine ethical (...) issues with three modes of “family presence” or “being there or with” a separated family member during the current COVID-19 pandemic: physical, virtual, and surrogate. Physical visits, stays, or care by family members in isolation facilities are usually prohibited, discouraged, or limited to exceptional circumstances. Virtual presence for isolated patients is often recommended and used to enable communication. When visits are disallowed, frontline workers sometimes act as surrogate family for patients, such as performing bedside vigils for dying patients. Drawing on lessons from past outbreaks such as the 2002-2003 SARS epidemic and the recent Ebola epidemic in West Africa, we consider the ethical management of these modes of family presence and argue for the promotion of physical presence under some conditions. (shrink)

Taiwan was affected by an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in early 2003. A questionnaire survey was conducted to determine (1) the perceptions of risk of SARS infection in nurses; (2) the proportion of nurses considering leaving their job; and (3) work as well as non-work factors related to nurses' consideration of leaving their job because of the SARS outbreak. Nearly three quarters (71.9%) of the participants believed they were 'at great risk of exposure to SARS', 49.9% felt'an (...) increase in workload', and 32.4% thought that people avoided them because of their job; 7.6% of the nurses not only considered that they should not care for SARS patients but were looking for another job or considering resignation. The main predictors of nurses' consideration of leaving their job were shorter tenure, increased work stress, perceived risk of fatality from SARS, and affected social relationships. The findings are important in view of potential impending threats of pandemics such as avian influenza. (shrink)

Air pollution is one of the largest environmental health risks globally but is often imperceptible to people. Air quality smartphone applications provide real-time localized air quality information and have the potential to help people learn about the health effects of air pollution and enable them to take action to protect their health. Hundreds of air quality apps are now available; however, there is scant information on how effective these mobile apps are at educating stakeholders about air pollution and promoting behavioral (...) change to protect their health. In this paper, we test how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations can enhance users’ engagement with air quality information through an app, and favor changes in protective behavior. We developed an air quality app, AirForU, with a built-in research study that was downloaded by 2740 users. We found that engagement was higher for users with intrinsic motivations, such as those who are health conscious, either because they are suffering from heart disease or other conditions aggravated by air pollution, or because they exercise frequently and want to maintain a healthy lifestyle. Extrinsic motivations such as notifications were also effective. App users stated that they frequently shared air quality information with others, learned about the Air Quality Index, and took measures to protect their health while using AirForU app. (shrink)

This comment responds to Kevin Warwick’s article on predictability and responsibility with respect to brain-machine interfaces in action. It compares conventional responsibility for device use with the potential consequences of phenomenological human-machine integration which obscures the causal chain of an act. It explores two senses of “responsibility”: 1) when it is attributed to a person, suggesting the morally important way in which the person is a causal agent, and 2) when a person is accountable and, on the basis of fairness (...) about rewards and sanctions, has a duty to act responsibly and accept liability. The comment suggests that, in the absence of absolute knowledge and predictability, we continue to engage in practical forms of reasoning about the responsibility for BMI-use in ways which are inclusive of uncertainties about the liability of persons versus devices and those who create them. (shrink)

Materialism—the view that all of reality is wholly determined by the very, very small—and extreme nominalism—the view that properties, kinds, and qualities do not really exist—have been the dominant view in analytic philosophy for the last 100 years or so. Both views, however, have failed to provide adequate accounts for the possibility of intentionality and of knowledge. We must therefore look to alternatives. One well-tested alternative, the hylomorphism of Aristotle and the medieval scholastics, was rejected without being refuted and so (...) deserves further examination. I will argue that Aristotelian hylomorphic provides a markedly superior account of knowledge, cognitive normativity, and intentionality. (shrink)

William Hasker has been one of the most trenchant and insightful critics of the revival of Molinism. He has focused on the “freedom problem”, a set of challenges designed to show that Molinism does not secure a place for genuinely free human action. These challenges focus on a key element in the Molinist story: the counterfactual conditionals of creaturely freedom. According to Molinism, these conditionals have contingent truth-values that are knowable to God prior to His decision of what world to (...) actualize. This divine “middle knowledge” is supposed to enable God to execute a detailed plan for world history without any loss of creaturely freedom. Hasker has argued that this middle knowledge nonetheless deprives us of the power to do otherwise than we do, a crucial element in human freedom and responsibility. I hope to accomplish three things in this paper. First, I want to step back a bit and explore the nature of the conditionals of creaturely free decision-making, bringing out some of the difficulties in delimiting their scope and nature. Second, I will explore the implications of different answers to an important question that has not been addressed in the literature: whether we have counterfactual power over the conditionals of divine freedom. And, third, I would like to recommend to Molinists a revision that offers a solution to the freedom problem. (shrink)

Discussions of conservatism in epistemology often fail to demonstrate that the principle of conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations. In this paper, I hope to show two things. First, there is a defensible version of the principle of conservatism, a version that applies only to what I will call our basic beliefs. Those who deny that conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations do so because they fail to take into account the necessarily social, diachronic and self-correcting nature of our epistemic (...) practice. Second, I will attempt to show how our basic beliefs are justified via this principle of conservatism. (shrink)

Picturing is a poorly understood element of Sellars’s philosophical project. We diagnose the problem with picturing as follows: on the one hand, it seems that it must be connected with action in order for it to do its job. On the other hand, the representational states of a picturing system are characterized in descriptive and seemingly static terms. How can static terms be connected with action? To solve this problem, we adopt a concept from recent work in Sellarsian metaethics: the (...) idea of a material practical inference, which (we argue) features centrally in how we picture. The key distinction is that the picturing of nonhuman animals involves only Humean material practical inference, in which representational states are corrected only by feedback from the environment and not from discursive interactions. The resulting view shows that Sellars’s contributions to practical philosophy (especially theory of action and metaethics) cannot be separated from his contributions to philosophy of mind, language, and cognitive science. Further, the view makes it clear that picturing is neither a version of the Given, nor is it a fifth wheel to inferential role in explaining representation, but is essential to Sellars’s model of how animals—including humans—represent their environment. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a version of the medical model of disability, which defines disability as an enduring biological dysfunction that causes its bearer a significant degree of impairment. We should accept the medical model, I argue, because it succeeds in capturing our judgments about what conditions do and do not qualify as disabilities, because it offers a compelling explanation for what makes a condition count as a disability, and because it justifies why the federal government should spend hundreds (...) of billions of dollars, annually, on aid and accommodations for disabled people. After responding to a pair of objections Elizabeth Barnes has raised against the medical model, I contrast it with Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu's welfarist account of disability, and with Barnes's own mere-difference view. Both of these accounts face serious challenges, although elements of Barnes's view can—and, in my opinion, should—be adopted by proponents of the medical model. (shrink)

No contemporary compatibilist account of free will can be complete unless it engages with the consequence argument. I will argue that Wilfrid Sellars offered an ingenious version of compatibilism that can be used to refute the consequence argument. Unfortunately, owing to the opacity of Sellars’s writings on free will, his solution has been neglected. I will reconstruct his view here, demonstrating how it represents a powerful challenge to the consequence argument and tying it to some recent developments in the compatibilist (...) literature. (shrink)

Drawing on a rich pragmatist tradition, this book offers an account of the different kinds of ‘oughts’, or varieties of normativity, that we are subject to contends that there is no conflict between normativity and the world as science describes it. The authors argue that normative claims aim to evaluate, to urge us to do or not do something, and to tell us how a state of affairs ought to be. These claims articulate forms of action-guidance that are different in (...) kind from descriptive claims, with a wholly distinct practical and expressive character. This account suggests that there are no normative facts, and so nothing that needs any troublesome shoehorning into a scientific account of the world. This work explains that nevertheless, normative claims are constrained by the world, and answerable to reason and argumentation, in a way that makes them truth-apt and objective. (shrink)

Fifteen years ago, Sharon Street and Richard Joyce advanced evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism, which purported to show that the evolutionary history of our moral beliefs makes moral realism untenable. These arguments have since given rise to a flurry of objections; the epistemic principles Street and Joyce relied upon, in particular, have come in for a number of serious challenges. My goal in this paper is to develop a new account of evolutionary debunking which avoids the pitfalls Street and (...) Joyce encountered and responds to the most pressing objections they faced. I begin by presenting a striking thought experiment to serve as an analogy for the evolution of morality; I then show why calibrationist views of higher-order evidence are crucial to the evolutionary debunking project; I outline a new rationale for why finding out that morality was selected to promote cooperation suggests that our moral judgments are unreliable; and I explain why evolutionary debunking arguments do not depend on our having a dedicated faculty for moral cognition. All things considered, I argue, evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism are on relatively secure footing – provided, at least, that we accept a calibrationist account of higher-order evidence. (shrink)

Acts of helping others are often based on mixed motivations. Based on this claim, it has been argued that the use of a financial reward to incentivize organ donation is compatible with promoting altruism in organ donation. In its report Human Bodies: Donation for Medicine and Research, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics uses this argument to justify its suggestion to pilot a funeral payment scheme to incentivize people to register for deceased organ donation in the UK. In this article, I (...) cast a sceptical eye on the above Nuffield report's argument that its proposed funeral payment scheme would prompt deceased organ donations that remain altruistic . Specifically, I illustrate how this scheme may prompt various forms of mixed motivations which would not satisfy the report's definition of altruism. Insofar as the scheme produces an expectation of the reward, it stands diametrical to promoting an ‘altruistic perspective’. My minimal goal in this article is to argue that altruism is not motivationally compatible with reward as an incentive for donation. My broader goal is to argue that if a financial reward is used to incentivize organ donation, then we should recognize that the donation system is no longer aiming to promote altruism. Rewarded donation would not be altruistic but it may be ethical given a persistent organ shortage situation. (shrink)

This paper will discuss why and how social network sites ought to be used in surrogate decision making (SDM), with focus on a context like Singapore in which substituted judgment is incorporated as part of best interest assessment for SDM, as guided by the Code of Practice for making decisions for those lacking mental capacity under the Mental Capacity Act (2008). Specifically, the paper will argue that the Code of Practice already supports an ethical obligation, as part of a patient-centred (...) care approach, to look for and appraise social network site (SNS) as a source of information for best interest decision making. As an important preliminary, the paper will draw on Berg’s arguments to support the use of SNS information as a resource for SDM. It will also supplement her account for how SNS information ought to be weighed against or considered alongside other evidence of patient preference or wishes, such as advance directives and anecdotal accounts by relatives. (shrink)

Responses to outbreaks, epidemics and pandemics involves a heterogeneous set of activities that aim to address threats to public health. In addition to research, non-research activities, such as prevention and control interventions, and surveillance, are conducted. The boundaries between research and non-research responses can rapidly blur during a public health emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic. There may be common elements between these types of activities, and they may draw on the same resources and infrastructure. Non-research activities, such as surveillance (...) and emergency non-research use of unproven interventions, and research activities must all be undertaken in an ethical manner as components of emergency response. However, care is needed to distinguish between non-research public health activities and research, because research often has considerations and requirements for its ethical conduct which are distinct from non-research public health activities. Research aims to produce generalizable knowledge, and mechanisms such as participant consent and independent ethics review aim to ensure that the rights and interests of research participants are respected. Ensuring that research and non-research activities are appropriately distinguished can additionally promote proper coordination of such activities, and increase trust and social accountability in pandemic responses. Consequently, it is important to distinguish between these different activities on the basis of their primary aim, and to consider whether their implementation is justifiable, based on their aims and the relevant ethical framework for each type of activity, and how they are coordinated as part of the larger collective activity of emergency response and management. Complex questions arise about how the different stakeholders involved in decision-making should make valid and justifiable decisions about whether the response activity is research or non-research. The cases in this chapter invite consideration about how such decisions should be made, and their implications, in the context of applications to conduct retrospective research into the outcomes of emergency uses of unproven interventions outside clinical trials, and of characterising antibody-testing initiatives and systematic data collection activities as surveillance or research. (shrink)

Extending Alvin Plantinga’s model of warranted belief to the beliefs of groups as a whole, I argue that if the dogmatic beliefs of the Catholic Church are true, they are also warranted. Catholic dogmas are warranted because they meet the three conditions of my model: they are formed (1) by ministers functioning properly (2) in accordance with a design plan that is oriented towards truth and reliable (3) in a social environment sufficiently similar to that for which they were designed. (...) I show that according to Catholic doctrine the authoritative spokespersons of the Church—ecumenical councils and popes—meet these conditions when defining dogmas. I also respond to the objection that the warrant of Catholic dogmas is defeated by the plurality of non-Catholic Christian sects that deny Catholic dogmas. (shrink)

Healthcare facilities in receiving countries regularly encounter guest workers whose need for acute or subacute care triggers the prospect of termination of employment and repatriation. In these scenarios, country‐specific migration and employment policies and norms of medical professionalism and ethics offer some guidance, but also create tensions. It is not clear under what conditions such medical repatriation is ethically permissible.This paper analyses the application of a previously articulated criteria for the ethical medical repatriation of undocumented immigrants, to the situation of (...) documented guest workers, with focus on the context of Singapore. We examine how these standards could be adapted and applied to the provision of care for guest workers, and argue that healthcare institutions and medical professionals have a duty to intervene in employers’ decisions to repatriate guest workers for medico‐economic reasons when repatriation essentially amounts to ‘patient dumping’. Barriers and challenges in implementing the criteria, and their possible solutions will be discussed. (shrink)

Developing World Bioethics, Volume 21, Issue 4, Page 227-236, December 2021.

This article argues that outbreak preparedness and response should implement a ‘family presence’ policy for infected patients in isolation that includes the option of physical visits and care within the isolation facility under some conditions. While such a ‘physical family presence’ policy could increase infections during an outbreak and may raise moral dilemmas, we argue that it is ethically justified based on the least infringement principle and the need to minimize the harms and burdens of isolation as a restrictive measure. (...) Categorical prohibition of PFP during the course of an outbreak or epidemic is likely to result in unnecessary harms to patients and families, and violate values such as the moral commitments of families to care for each other. Supporting the option of PFP under particular circumstances, on the other hand, will least infringe these moral considerations. An additional reason for a family presence policy is that it may facilitate voluntary cooperation with isolation and other restrictive measures. We provide an analysis of these considerations for supporting modes of family presence during an outbreak emergency, before defending the riskier option of PFP in the isolation facility from plausible objections and concerns. (shrink)

BackgroundHealth screening is undertaken to identify individuals who are deemed at higher risk of disease for further diagnostic testing so that they may possibly benefit from interventions to modify the natural course of disease. In Singapore, screening tests are widely available in the form of a package, which bundles multiple tests in one session and commonly includes non-recommended tests. There are various ethical issues associated with such testing as they may not be clinically appropriate and can result in more harm (...) than benefit. This article describes the practice of health screening packages, identifies the ethical issues arising from such packages and discusses the implications of these ethical issues on policy and practice of screening in Singapore.MethodsA content analysis of the websites of providers offering general health screening packages to individuals was conducted. A total of 14 health screening package providers were analysed for how packages were conducted and promoted, how clinically appropriate screening tests were, and the price range and composition of screening packages. A normative ethical analysis based on the four principles approach of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice in biomedical ethics was used.ResultsTwelve of the 14 providers included non-recommended tests such as tumour markers, treadmill stress tests and MRI scans in their general health screening packages. Package prices ranged from S$26 to S$10,561, with providers charging higher when more tests were included. Health screening packages were broadly conducted in three stages: the offer and selection of a health screening package; medical assessment and performance of screening tests; a post-screening review. While material provided by all providers was factual, there was no information on the potential risks or harms of screening.ConclusionSeveral ethical issues were identified that should be addressed with regard to health screening packages in Singapore. A key issue was the information gap between providers and patients, which may result in patients undergoing inappropriate testing that may be more harmful than beneficial. Health screening packages can stimulate unnecessary demand for healthcare and contribute to an inequitable distribution of healthcare resources. (shrink)

Situation theory, as developed by Barwise and his collaborators, is used to demonstrate the possibility of defining teleology (and related notions, like that of proper or biological function) in terms of higher order causation, along the lines suggested by Taylor and Wright. This definition avoids the excessive narrowness that results from trying to define teleology in terms of evolutionary history or the effects of natural selection. By legitimating the concept of teleology, this definition also provides promising new avenues for solving (...) long standing problems in the philosophy of mind, such as the problems of intentionality and mental causation. (shrink)

Committee decision making is examined in this study focusing on the role assigned to the committee members. In particular, we are concerned about the comparison between committee performance under specialization and non-specialization of the decision makers. Specialization (in the context of project or public policy selection) means that the decision of each committee member is based on a narrow area, which typically results in the acquirement and use of relatively high expertise in that area. When the committee members’ expertise is (...) already determined, specialization only means that the decision of each committee member is based solely on his/her relatively high expertise area. This form of specialization is potentially inferior relative to non-specialization under which the decision of each committee member is based on different areas, not just his/her relatively high expertise area. Given that the expertise of the committee members is already determined but unknown, our analysis focuses on non-specializing individuals whose decision is based on a decision rule that does not require information on the decision-making skills. Under these realistic assumptions, non-specialization is shown to be preferable over specialization, depending on the aggregation rule applied by the committee. The significance of our approach is not limited to the specific results that we obtain. Rather, it should be viewed as a first step toward a deeper examination of the role of individual decision makers in enhancing the performance of collective decision making. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars’s ethical theory was rich and deeply innovative. On Sellars’s view, moral judgments express a special kind of shared intention. Thus, we should see Sellars as an early advocate of an expressivism of plans and intentions, and an early theorist of collective intentionality. He supplemented this theory with a sophisticated logic of intentions, a robust theory of the categorical validity of normative expressions, a subtle way of reconciling the cognitive and motivating aspects of moral judgment, and much more— all (...) within a strict nominalism that preserves Sellars’s commitment to naturalism. The Ethics of Wilfrid Sellars offers the first systematic treatment of this sadly neglected aspect of Sellars’s work and demonstrates that his ethical theory— just like his more widely discussed epistemology— has much to contribute to current debates. (shrink)

Structural biology has experienced several transformative technological advances in recent years. These include: development of extremely bright X-ray sources and the use of electrons to extend protein crystallography to ever decreasing crystal sizes; and an increase in the resolution attainable by cryo-electron microscopy. Here we discuss the use of these techniques in general terms and highlight their application for biological filament systems, an area that is severely underrepresented in atomic resolution structures. We assemble a model of a capped tropomyosin-actin minifilament (...) to demonstrate the utility of combining structures determined by different techniques. Finally, we survey the methods that attempt to transform high resolution structural biology into more physiological environments, such as the cell. Together these techniques promise a compelling decade for structural biology and, more importantly, they will provide exciting discoveries in understanding the designs and purposes of biological machines. Structural biology is undergoing technological advancements that now reveal the structures of previously inaccessible biological machines. Microfocus synchrotron beamlines, X-ray free electron lasers, and MicroED cope with vanishingly small crystals, while cryo-electron microscopy targets single molecules at near atomic resolution. These advances promise an exciting decade for structural biology. (shrink)